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This paper describes modelling of consequences of biogas leakage from a gasholder 
on agricultural biogas station. Four scenarios were selected for the purpose of this 
work. A rupture of gasholders membrane and instantaneous explosion of gas cloud, 
blast of gas with delay, emptying of whole volume of gas (without initiation) and 
initiation of gas with Jet-Fire. Leakage of gas is modelled by special software and 
consequences are determined on the basis of results. The first scenario was 
modelled with help of equations because used software does not include an 
appropriate model. A farm with high building density was chosen as a model case. 
Biogas is replaced by methane because used software does not support modelling of 
dispersion of mixtures. From this viewpoint, a conservative approach is applied 
because biogas contains “only” approximately 60% of methane (in dependence on 
technology and processed material).    
 




Práce se zabývá modelováním možných následků úniku bioplynu na zemědělské 
bioplynové stanici. Pro účel této práce byly vybrány celkem čtyři havarijní scénáře. 
První scénář předpokládá poškození plynojemu a okamžitý výbuch plynného mraku. 
Druhý scénář předpokládá výbuch bioplynu se zpožděním, třetí scénář únik 
veškerého objemu bioplynu ze zásobníku bez následné iniciace a poslední scénář 
předpokládá iniciaci uniklého bioplynu a následný Jet-Fire. Scénáře byly modelovány 
s pomocí speciálního software. Následky jednotlivých scénářů byly poté určeny na 
základě výstupů z tohoto software. Jako modelový příklad byla zvolena zemědělská 
bioplynová stanice s vysokou hustotou zástavby. Pro účely modelování byl bioplyn 
nahrazen methanem. Z tohoto hlediska byl tedy zvolen konzervativní přístup, protože 
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bioplyn v závislosti na technologii a zpracovávaném materiálu obsahuje přibližně 
60% methanu.  
 
Klíčové slova: bioplyn, havárie, stanice, zemědělství  
 
Introduction  
Biogas stations form a very dense network in some European countries. The highest 
number of biogas stations in Europe is in Germany (9035 in 2014). However, a lot of 
biogas stations are also in other countries such as Italy (1391 in 2014), Switzerland 
(620 in 2014) or Czech Republic (554 in 2014) (European Biogas Association, 2014).    
The amount of biogas systems increases in Europe. However, this growth is not as 
dramatic as in previous years. For example, in the following years, stagnation is 
expected in Germany or Czech Republic. Contrarily, countries such as Romania, 
Bulgaria and Poland still have a high potential and in these countries, further growth 
of biogas stations can be expected in the following years.   
A growing number of units increase a probability that in the future an extraordinary 
event can occur on the biogas station. For this reason, an adequate attention must 
be paid to safety of equipment. In principle, four main risks exist on biogas stations: 
deflagration, poisoning, asphyxiation, and environmental damage due to leakage of 
liquid material (Schroeder et al., 2014).  
Deflagration, poisoning and asphyxiation can occur in the case that biogas releases 
out of technological installations. This leakage of biogas is often associated with 
death due to H2S or CO2 poisoning or explosion. The appropriate knowledge about 
spread of gaseous cloud can help to estimate the consequences of accidental 
leakage. The present article is focused on biogas dispersion and determination of 
consequences caused by its deflagration. Software ALOHA (Areal Locations of 
Hazardous Atmospheres) by EPA (US Environmental Protection Agency) and NOAA 
(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) was used for mathematical 
modelling of biogas dispersion and biogas deflagration. ALOHA is a relatively simple 
tool, which is used for modelling of accidents with potential leakage of dangerous 
gaseous substance. This tool was utilized in many works and studies (Shao and 
Duan, 2012; Tseng et al., 2012; SWCA, 2010). The main objective of this work is the 
calculation of consequences in the case accident leakage of biogas in biogas station. 
Total four scenarios were selected for this purpose. These scenarios were selected 
with respect to experiences with accidents on hydrocarbon gasholders.    
 
Materials and methods 
Locality 
An agricultural farm was chosen as a model case. Placement of the reactor with 
gasholder and locations of other buildings are shown in Figure 1. Building density in 
the area is relatively high. The buildings near the gasholder are used for storage of 
materials and livestock breeding.  
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Figure 1. Placement of biogas station within the farm 
Obrázek 1. Umístění bioplynové stanice v rámci zemědělského družstva 
 
Modelled scenarios 
I. Rupture of gasholders membrane – instantaneous explosion of gas cloud 
II. Rupture of gasholders membrane – blast of gas with delay  
III. Rupture of gasholders membrane – emptying of the whole volume of gas, 
without initiation 
IV. Rupture of gasholders membrane – initiation of gas and Jet-Fire 
 
Calculation  
Calculations in accordance with the equation listed below were carried out for 
modelling of scenario I. The software ALOHA was used for calculation of other 
scenarios. The reason is that ALOHA is designed above all for leakage of substances 
from tanks produced from steel. However, the gasholders in the biogas station are 
produced from a special textile.  
The following experimental equation is valid if the explosion occurs in the air without 















Δp overpressure at the forefront of shock waves [MPa] 
(1) 
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z reduced distance  
 
This equation was selected because the gasholder is fixed on the reinforced concrete 
section of the reactor in the height of about 10 m. Therefore, in the case of explosion, 
the shockwave does not spread along the ground surface.  









R diameter [m] 
WTNT TNT equivalent [kg] 
 
Only a part of gaseous system participates in detonation. The volume (which is 
involved in reaction) depends on many factors, such as atmospheric condition, kind 
of buildings, type of terrain, etc. Values range from 2% to 70% (Lees, 1996). For 
example, the value of 3% for open terrain is stated in the method of Exxon (Lees, 
1996) or the value 2% is stated in the work of Brasie and Simpson (1968). For this 
work, the value of 3% has been selected.  
 
Software 
The software ALOHA 5.4.5 by EPA and NOAA was used in scenarios II, III and IV. 
An advantage of this software is its simplicity and easy operation. Limitations of this 
software are the following (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, 2007): 
 very low wind speeds;  
 very stable atmospheric conditions;  
 wind shifts;  
 particulates or chemical mixing;  
 or concentration patchiness, particularly near the release source;  
 or terrain steering effects  
Based on this, wind speeds of minimum 5 km per hour and unstable atmospheric 
conditions were included. Biogas is a mixture of gases and ALOHA is not suitable for 
modelling of mixtures. For this reason, conservatively, the variant of pure methane 
leakage was received for the purpose of work.  
 
Input data 
a) Quality of biogas - Biogas is a mixture of CO2 and ﬂammable gas CH4, which is 
produced by bacterial conversion of organic matter under anaerobic (oxygen-
free) conditions (Raven and Gregersen, 2007). Gases CO2 and CH4 are majority 
gases; however biogas also contains various different kinds of gases. Minor 
(2) 
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gases include e.g. hydrogen, carbon monoxide, water vapour, hydrogen 
sulphide, ammonia, nitrous oxide and hydrogen chloride (Straka, 2006). 
Methane and hydrogen sulphide are the most important gases from the view 
point of safety. Therefore, this work is focused on deflagration and dispersion of 
methane. Generally, the concentration of methane in biogas is variable and can 
reach value up to 75% (Vitázek and Havelka, 2011) in dependence on used 
material and technology. The concentration of methane in biogas is standardly 
around 60 – 65% at agricultural biogas plants. Explosion limits for biogas with 
concentration of 60% of methane and 40% carbon dioxide is 6% as lower 
explosion limit (LEL) and 12% as upper explosion limit (UEL) (SLFG, Safety rules 
for biogas system, 2008). A conservative approach is applied in modelling, i. e. 
the pure methane is considered.  
b) The amount of gases - The gasholder is of conical shape; diameter of cone is 30 
m and height is 8 m. The volume of such solid structure is 1885 m3. The value of 
200 kPa is considered as overpressure in the gasholder. The volume is 1987 m3 
(1426 kg) at normal pressure. ALOHA does not permit to select a cone type of 
cylinder for calculation. Therefore a vertical cylinder was selected as a 
substitution. 
  
c) Weather - Weather data were taken from the meteorological station. A prevailing 
direction of wind is from northwest. Values of meteorological conditions were set 
at average values and are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Meteorological conditions 
Tabulka 1. Meteorologické podmínky 
Condition Value 
Direction of wind NW 
Cloud cover 7 
Air temperature 10 °C 
Humidity 70% 
Wind speed 5 m*s-1 
Stability class D 
 
 
Results and discussion 
Scenario I 
Scenario I considers the situation when the membrane of gasholder ruptures and the 
whole volume of biogas explodes. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that this scenario 
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is rather unlikely. The rupture of gasholders can be caused by lightning, which 
initiated a flammable mixture at the same time. This type of accident occurred in the 
Czech Republic in 2011 (Trávníček and Kotek, 2015).  
Consequences of explosion of the entire volume of substances cannot be determined 
by software ALOHA because it does not offer any similar scenario to be used for 
calculation. Therefore, the equations 1 and 2 were used.   
The values of overpressures depending on the distances are shown in Figure 2. This 
graph is divided into four zones where each of them represents a degree of damage 
classification. This classification is given in Table 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Dependence of overpressure on the distance from the source 
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Table 2. Damage classification (Stephens, 1970) 
Tabulka 2. Klasifikace poškození objektu 





A Total destruction > 69 > 10 
B Severe damage > 20.7 > 3 
C Moderate damage > 9 > 1.3 
D Light damage > 3.45 > 0.5 
 
A total destruction occurs up to the distance of approximately 23 m from the middle 
point of gasholder. Severe damage will be up to the distance of about 60 m. The 
effects of the respective damage are shown in Table 3. Assuming nearest buildings 
are located at the distance of about 50 m (technical buildings are only 20 m far from 
the gasholders), damage would be extensive.  
 
Table 3. Effects of respective damage by blast wave (Clancey, 1972) 




Breakage of windows, small, under strain 0.7 
Minor damage to house structure 4.8 
Partial demolition of houses 6.9 
Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses 13.8 
Loaded train wagons overturned 48.3 
Probable total destruction of buildings 69 
 
However, the effect of damage would be actually less intensive for several reasons. 
The first reason is that the amount of methane in biogas is approximately 60% (the 
concentration depends on the type of technology and material, which is processed); 
the second reason is that the gasholders are located on the steel concrete reactor in 
similar height as the surrounding buildings. The shockwave should not to have such 
an effect as in the case when it spreads along the surface. The next reason is that 
mixing of explosive substances is limited by the manner in which the gasholder will 
rupture and how strong the initiation will be. The process of methanogenesis is 
primarily anaerobic. When the membrane rupture is initiated by (for example) 
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lightning, only a limited volume of biogas will be mixed with air. Moreover, a part of 
shockwave energy will be expended to damage of membrane. Last but not least the 
TNT model is applicable above all for detonation with overpressure 100 kPa and 
more and for a great distances (Makovička and Janovský, 2008). From this it follows 
that the calculated values are approximate and the estimated consequences are very 
conservative. Nevertheless, with regard to the foregoing, can be said that the 
placement of buildings in vicinity (as in the model case) is not suitable. This situation 
increases the risk of injuries of employees or livestock by wreck of gasholder, roof or 
smashed windows.  
 
Scenario II 
The next scenario presupposes that biogas begins to leak through the hole created 
by mechanical damage or lightening. However, biogas is initiated with delay 
(Koopman, Ermak, 2007). This scenario can occur in the case when the gasholder 
has only one layer. Nevertheless, a frequent solution of gasholders is a double-layer 
system. In this case, damage to the first layer means a drop in air pressure between 
the layers; leakage of biogas is highly unlikely. This model example assumes a one-
layer gasholder system. The opening size is set to 80 cm (for the case of mechanical 
damage). The results are shown in Figures 3 and 4. 
 
 
Figure 3. Threat zone of blast 








Figure 4. Threat zone on the plan of farm area 
Obrázek 4. Plocha ohrožená výbuchem umístěná na mapovém podkladu 
 
The threat zone shown in the figures does not represent a blast area from a single 
explosion, but rather a composite of potential blast areas for all different ignition time 
scenarios. A drawn zone in the figures shows where the overpressure of potential 
shockwaves is higher than 6.89 kPa (1.0 psi) and lower than 24.1 kPa (3.5 psi). In 
this zone, damage to parts of agricultural buildings can occur along with injuries of 
persons (or animals) in the nearby area.  
If the hole in the gasholder occurs due to defects in material, it can be assumed that 
the size of this hole would be negligible. In this case, leakage of biogas would 
disperse to the atmosphere and the explosive mixture would probably not have 
arisen.  
Unfortunately the membrane gasholders are not a frequent solution in chemical 
industries and thus the data about probabilities of rupture of gasholders membrane 
are not available. 
 
Scenario III 
This scenario is similar to the previous scenario; the only difference is that initiation 
does not occur (Nicholls, 1979). A gaseous cloud creates with potential possibility of 
initiation. The size of this cloud is shown in Figures 5 and 6. The cloud is divided into 
three areas; the first one (the smallest) is the zone with concentration of gas greater 
than 50 000 ppm while the concentration of gas in the second zone is greater than 
30 000 and lower than 50 000 ppm, and the largest zone represents the zone with 
concentration of gas greater than 5 000 ppm and lower than 30 000 ppm. 
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Figure 5. Threat zone of flammable area 
Obrázek 5. Plocha ohrožená výbušnou atmosférou 
 
 
Figure 6. Threat zone of flammable area on the plan of farm 
Obrázek 6. Plocha ohrožená výbušnou atmosférou umístěna na mapovém podkladu 
 
The lower explosion limit of biogas with concentration 60% of methane is 60 000 










The last scenario represents the situation with no explosion; however biogas is burnt 
as jet-fire (Lowesmith, 2007). The opening size is considered the same as in scenario 
II, i.e. 80 cm. Threat zones are given by Figures 7 and 8. The area is divided into 
three zones. In the first zone (the smallest), the thermal radiation is higher than  
10 kW*m-2. In the second zone it is higher than 5 kW*m-2 but lower than 10 kW*m-2 
and in the last zone the thermal radiation is higher than 2 kW*m-2 but lower than  
5 kW*m-2. In accordance with EPA, if the value of thermal radiation is higher than  
10 kW*m-2, there is a risk of lethality within 60 s. If the value is higher than 5 kW*m-2, 
there is a risk of second degree burns within 60 s and at 2 kW*m-2 there is a risk of 
pain within 60 s. 
 
 
Figure 7. Threat zone of thermal radiation 
Obrázek 7. Plocha ohrožena tepelným tokem 
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Figure 8. Threat zone of thermal radiation on the plan of farm 
Obrázek 8. Plocha ohrožena tepelným tokem umístěna na mapovém podkladu  
 
In the case when the diameter of opening size was considered to be 5 cm, the 
diameter of the area with thermal radiation > 10 kW*m-2 would be approximately 20 
m. The diameter of gasholder is 30 m. This implies that if the hole is created 
somewhere at the perimeter of gasholder, fatal injuries can occur at the distance of 
up to 10 m from the gasholder.   
 
Conclusion 
The article was devoted to modelling of biogas leakage from the gasholder and to the 
consequences that would occur due to initiation of explosive mixtures. A conservative 
approach was chosen for the case when biogas was replaced by methane in ALOHA 
software and for calculations. In terms of safety, the advantage of biogas is that it is 
generated mostly in anaerobic environment at low pressure (nevertheless, some 
technologies utilize an air for reduction of H2S in biogas, but concentration is such to 
an explosion atmosphere do not arise). In this regard it can be expected that the 
consequences of potential initiation of explosive or flammable mixture are not as 
intensive as in the case of gasholders on other hydrocarbons. It seems that the 
results of this work can confirm this assumption. However, the risks should not be 
underestimated. The results represented by the figures show that in the surrounding 
area of the gasholder, fatal injuries or property damage can occur. From this 
viewpoint, the placement of gasholder in close vicinity (as in the model case) of 
buildings is not recommended. This increases a risk of injuries of people or animals 
who can reside in the surrounding buildings. The results of calculations in work can 
be summarized as follows: 
 Consequences of the first scenario would be the most extensive in accordance 
with assumption. However, the leakage of whole volume of biogas and its 
explosion is unlikely. The deflagration of part of biogas volume is more likely.  
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 The second scenario assume a leakage of biogas and its deflagration with 
delay. The value of overpressure ranges from 1.0 psi to 3.5 psi. In the case 
the front part of building near gasholder would be probably damaged.  
 If a whole volume of biogas leakage without initiation (third scenario), the area 
with concentration of gas between 3%vol – 5%vol is approximately 70 m long 
and 10 m wide. It is an area, where high risk of ignition exists. 
 In the case of fourth scenario (jet-flame) fatal injuries occurs within a diameter 
of 10 m. It means only in the immediate vicinity of the biogas reactor.  
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